What's the use of human rights?

Is there any sense in fighting today for the assertion of human rights? How do we justify this concept, the child of Euro-American enlightenment, at a time of global contact with non-European cultures, for example with those that defend Asian values?
Is it admissible to export democracy even when not requested? And finally, what can legitimately be done and what are the limits within which action may be desirable in defence of human rights? I believe the politics of humanitarian aid, in the form of battles “in favour of human rights”, is still fairly patriarchal in its attitude, in its white ethnology directly descended from a (material and cultural) colonialism. Compared to a few years ago, however, the framework of human rights, as an operative concept of international law, seems to lay itself open to criticism from many sectors: from those who detect ulterior motives in the international actions of humanitarian interference; but above all, in a less contingent sense, from those very philosophical circles which, more than two hundred years ago, made a fundamental contribution to the building of the rights of man. From the point of view of principle, the vicious circle within which the whole question is debated is to be ascribed to the fact that the concept of human rights implicitly gives rise to a category of persons who, by the very fact of not enjoying those rights, find themselves in the dramatic condition of being “second-class humans” living “on the margins of humanity”. Does it make sense to bestow human, presumably inalienable rights, on people who are considered, treated and perceived as less than human beings, and accordingly alienated from these rights? The paradox is clear. Human rights seem to be only – as Jacques Rancière says – a reject, a residue of civil and political rights (fully enjoyed by few). In general, human rights are claimed by those with all the benefits of democracy for those who will, presumably, in any case have none. In negotiating the explosive contradictoriness of human rights, it is easy to arrive at provocations of this kind. The objections agisterially raised in the highly controversial works of Slavoj Zizek (and others with him) point up the weakness of the whole doctrine of humanitarian interventionism (or should we say fundamentalism?).The problem of the certainty of rights, says Zizek, is not humanitarian at all, but political.
The (abstract) theory of human rights may be referred to only if a political and social void exists, only in the event of a demobilised (concrete) policy of civil and political rights, the only one with answers to a society demanding a state of law. While human rights come from above and cannot be applied to all (does the right to freedom of expression have the same sense for a European or for an Asian?), civil and political rights are, conversely, the product of a historical phase which a whole community contributes to construct. This observation calls for serious reflection if we are to identify the point where the contrast, until now sterile and rhetorical, can be overcome between the homologising universalism of human rights and the identifying pluralism of individual cultures. The alternating voices heard in the Intersections of this issue set down, from perspectives strictly alternative to the mainstream, the reasons (or false reasons) for the rights of man, bearing in mind that one of the most interesting angles on this subject refers to architecture as art, appointed to take care of human living space, as a place of freedom, complexity and openness.